Thanks for the thoughts and feedback.Fair point on the reconstruction attack.The library is deliberately scoped as tamper-evident, not tamper-proof; it detects modification but does not prevent wholesale chain reconstruction by someone with storage access. The design assumes defence-in-depth: S3 Object Lock (Compliance mode) at the infrastructure layer, hash chain verification at the application layer.External timestamping (OpenTimestamps, RFC 3161) would definitely add independent temporal anchoring and is worth considering as an optional feature. From what I can see, Article 12 does not currently prescribe specific cryptographic mechanisms (but of course the assurance level would increase with it).On the regulatory question: Article 12 requires &quot;automatic recording&quot; that enables monitoring and reconstruction and current regulatory guidance does not require tamper-proof storage (only trustworthy, auditable records). The hash chain plus immutable storage is designed to meet that bar, but what you raise here is good and thoughtful.

Anyone can generate an alternative chain of sha256 hashes. perhaps you should consider timestamping, e.g. <a href="https:&#x2F;&#x2F;opentimestamps.org&#x2F;" rel="nofollow">https:&#x2F;&#x2F;opentimestamps.org&#x2F;</a> As for what the regulation says, I haven&#x27;t looked but perhaps it doesn&#x27;t require the system to be actually tamper-proof.

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